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Bullshit psychology? 
 
Earp (2014) 
 
 
Liars, bullshitters, and scholars 
 
According to Frankfurt (2005), liars and bullshitters both falsely represent themselves as 
prioritising truth. They differ because liars actively try to hide the truth whilst bullshitters 
care less about the truth than they do about other things that are potentially in conflict with it.   
 
Let’s use the term “scholars” for people who sincerely prioritise truth.  
 
Note that this cast list is compiled by intentions and endeavours, not by outcomes. All three 
characters may communicate truth or falsehood irrespective of whether they do so 
unintentionally, incidentally, or purposefully.  
 
Note also that there may not be strong relationships between character and competence. 
People can fall anywhere between ineptitude and finesse at lying, bullshitting, and 
scholarship.  
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Bullshit and lies in the pool of psychological knowledge 
 
Although perhaps no more so than in other disciplines, there is nevertheless a worrying 
amount of outright fraud in psychology. Each of the following people, for example, has fairly 
recently had high-status peer-reviewed papers retracted because of confirmed or suspected 
fraud: Marc Hauser, Jens Förster, Dirk Smeesters, Karen Ruggiero, Lawrence Sanna, Michael 
LaCour and, a long way in front with 58 retractions, Diederik Stapel. It seems reasonable to 
expect that there will be further revelations and retractions before too long.  
 
That’s a depressing list but out-and-out lies in psychology may be the least of our worries. 
Several pieces of evidence demonstrate compellingly that contemporary psychology is 
liberally sprayed with bullshit.  
 
1. Improbable patterns of statistical significance. Almost all published studies report 
statistically significant effects even though very many of them have sample sizes that 
are too small to reliably detect the effects they report (Cohen, 1962, Bakker et al., 
2012). Similarly, multi-study papers often report literally infeasible frequencies of 
statistically significant effects (Schimmack, 2012).  
 
2. Inadequate methodological and statistical processes. Many of the analyses and 
procedures psychologists use do not justify the conclusions drawn from them. A 
striking and common example is failing to correct for multiple tests. If there is a fixed 
chance of obtaining a statistically significant result (e.g., p ≤ .05) when there is no 
genuine phenomenon, the chance of obtaining misleading statistical significance 
increases with the number of tests performed. Psychologists routinely fail to correct 
for multiple comparisons (e.g., Cramer et al., 2014). Apparent results, such as 
associations between astrological star signs and particular medical conditions, often 
disappear once appropriate corrections are made (Austin et al., 2006). 
 
3. Failed replications. Few successful attempts have been made to rigorously 
replicate findings psychology. Recent attempts to do so have suggested that even 
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studies almost identical to original ones rarely produce reassuring confirmation of 
their reported results (e.g., Open Science Collaboration, 2015).  
 
4. Revisionism. Classic findings and interpretations of them that have until now been 
more or less accepted as ‘common knowledge’ in psychology are increasingly being 
challenged and revised (Jarrett, 2008).  
 
5. Exposed selectivity. Evidence is increasingly revealing just how many published 
studies have selectively included or omitted evidence to support claims that authors 
must know are far from accurately representing the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth (Belluz, 2015; Franco et al., 2016; Neuroskeptic, 2015). Inzlicht (2015) 
tells a story of two versions of a paper he acted as editor for; one submitted and the 
other accepted. The former mentioned 7 experiments each with significant effects that 
supported the authors’ claims. The latter disclosed an additional 11 existing studies, 
conducted more appropriate analyses, and reported only two significant effects.  
 
6. Researchers’ admissions. A considerable proportion of psychologists are willing to 
admit having engaged in questionable research practices (Fiedler & Schwarz, 2015; 
John et al., 2012). 
 
We know, then, that there are many serious problems in psychology. It has been suggested 
that much or possibly most of what we hold to be true in psychology is probably wrong 
(Ioannidis, 2005). A non-exhaustive list of the main reasons why follows. 
 
1. Professional limitations. Many researchers and reviewers appear not to have the 
methodological or statistical expertise necessary to effectively engage in science the 
way it is currently practiced in mainstream psychology (Colquhoun, 2014; Lindsay, 
2015). Scientists and reviewers also increasingly admit that they simply cannot keep 
up with the sheer volume and complexity of things in which they are allegedly 
supposed to have expertise (Siebert et al., 2015).  
 
2. Misplaced trust. Trust in others’ testimony is essential in science (Fricker, 2002). 
But, as we have just seen, much testimony in psychological science is not trustworthy. 
For this reason, researchers and communicators report as truths phenomena and 
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theories that they would almost certainly not believe if they critiqued them more 
thoroughly. This of course compounds the problem of untrustworthy claims in 
science. 
 
3.  p-hacking. Researchers make numerous decisions about methods and analysis, 
each of which may affect the statistical significance of the results they find, e.g., 
concerning sample size, sample composition, studies included or omitted from 
programmes of research, independent variable(s), dependent variable(s), control 
variable(s), moderation variable(s), mediating variable(s), potential outliers, statistical 
technique(s). This gives researchers a lot of leeway to present their results in ways 
that satisfy criteria other than optimal representation of the truth, e.g., to secure 
publications, grants, reputations, and careers (Fiedler, 2011). 
 
Simmons et al., (2011) vividly illustrate this by reporting a study which “revealed the 
predicted effect [that] people were nearly a year-and-a-half younger after listening to 
listening to When I’m 64” than they were after listening to “a control group tune that 
did not mention age” (p. 1360).  
 
Unconvinced readers can discover for themselves how easy it is to “Hack your way to 
scientific glory” by visiting an online tool and selecting different sets of variables 
from a genuine data base to find (or ‘fail’ to find) a significant relationship between 
the US economy and a particular party being in office (Aschwanden, 2015). It’s up to 
you whether you choose Democrat or Republican.  
 
4. Systemic biases in publishing. Traditionally, researchers are much less likely to 
submit manuscripts reporting experiments that did not find an effect and journals are 
far less likely to accept them if they do (Cohen, 1962; Peplow, 2014). Most 
prestigious journals also have a strong preference for novel and dramatic findings 
over the replications and incremental discoveries that are typical in an established 
science. If researchers want to be published in high-ranking peer-reviewed journals, 
therefore, they are highly incentivised to present highly selective and therefore 
misleading accounts of their research (Giner-Sorolla, 2012).  
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5. Poor quality-control. Peters & Ceci (1982) changed author names and affiliations 
and resubmitted 12 manuscripts to 12 high-quality psychology journals which had 
published the original manuscripts 18 to 32 months previously. The deceit was 
spotted in three cases. Eight of the remaining 9 were rejected, in many cases because 
of what were identified as “serious methodological flaws.” As journals proliferate and 
incentives to publish increase, quantity is rapidly overwhelming quality (Hannay, 
2014; Mitchell, 2015). 
 
6. Restricted openness. Typically, researchers control what information reviewers get 
exposed to and journal editors then shape what information readers have access to. If 
readers want further information, they usually have to request it from the researchers 
and they, their institution, or the publishing journal may place limits on what is 
shared. One consequence of this is that other researchers are considerably hampered 
in their ability to attempt replication or extension of the original findings. At the time 
of writing, University College London appears to have refused a freedom of 
information request for release of data to allow independent re-analysis of a study that 
was published in an outlet that explicitly promises such a possibility (Coyne, 2015).  
 
7. Perverted reward structures.  Materialistically, the current mechanisms of science 
production place individual researchers in a social dilemma (Carter, 2015). Whatever 
others do and whatever the collective consequences, it is in the individual researcher’s 
best economic interest to downgrade the importance of truth in order to maximise 
publications, grants, promotion, media exposure, indicators of impact, and all the 
other glittering prizes valued in contemporary scientific and academic communities 
(Engel, 2015). This is especially the case when organisations and processes that might 
otherwise ameliorate such pressures instead exacerbate them because they too allow 
concerns for truth to be downgraded or swamped by other ambitions, e.g., journal 
sales, student recruitment, political influence, etc. (Garfield, 1986).  
 
8. Myth persistence. Established and often cherished beliefs are difficult to change. 
Even when incorrect claims are exposed in ways that should be fatal, they continue to 
have an influence on subsequent scholarship (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Tatsioni et 
al., 2007). 
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Future perfect, bullshit present? 
 
There are a lot of current initiatives which advocates claim will make psychology much more 
reliable and valid in the future than it has been to date. These include measures to improve 
researchers’ methodological and statistical competence (Funder et al., 2014); change the sorts 
of statistical analyses they use (Cumming, 2014; Dienes, in press); provide pre-registration 
possibilities (Chambers et al., 2014), promote high-quality replications (Frank, 2015; Open 
Science Collaboration, 2012), facilitate open-access data and materials (Morey et al., 2015); 
encourage post-publication review (Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012), improve dissemination of 
information about corrections and retractions (Marcus & Oransky, 2011), change incentive 
structures (Nosek et al., 2012), etc.  
 
Some are sceptical that all such initiatives will bring net gains (Allchin, 2015; Blattman, 
2015; Earp & Trafimow, 2015; Klein et al., 2014; LeBel et al., 2015; Nyhan, & Reifler, 
2015; Sbarra, 2014; Spellman, 2015). Although we have views on such things, our concern 
here is less with the future than with the present.  
 
If a plethora of sweeping changes is required to achieve trustworthiness in psychological 
science in the future, what can psychologists claim on the basis of the research literature 
now? Are we lying or at best bullshitting when we tell students, grant-awarding bodies, 
policy-makers, the public, and each other about things that psychology has discovered 
(Lilienfeld, 2014; Matthews, 2015)? Are we disingenuous when we trumpet the 
epistemological superiority of so-called psychological science and its products (e.g., Bloom, 
2015)?  Given the multiple serious, widespread, and enduring problems we have, can we 
claim hand-on-heart to confidently know anything and, if so, how can we identify it among 
all the bullshit and lies?  
 
As it happens, we do think that our discipline has a lot to offer but we also think that norms 
of assessing and representing it need to change considerably if we are to minimise our at least 
complicit contribution to the collective production and concealment of yet more bullshit.  
 
Some provisional and tentative recommendations 
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1. Don’t give up. Meehl (1990) suggested that problems similar to those identified 
above make the psychological research literature “well-nigh uninterpretable”. When 
convincing others of this, he reported that some gave up studying questions of 
importance and interest to study things that were at least amenable to rigorous 
experimentation while others used defence mechanisms so that they could carry on as 
normal and continue to reap rewards while avoiding a guilty conscience (cf. Jussim, 
2015). Both strategies seem to us to be unattractive and unnecessary. We believe that 
psychology has the potential to make unique and important contributions to 
understanding important phenomena. 
 
2. Prioritise scholarship. Psychologists and their institutions should do everything 
within their power to champion truth and to confront all barriers to it. If we have to 
choose between maintaining our professional integrity and obtaining further personal 
or institutional benefits, may we have the will (and support) to pursue the former.  
 
3. Be honest. Championing truth requires honesty about ignorance, inadequacies, and 
mistakes (Salmon, 2003). Denying flaws helps no one, especially if our denials are 
accompanied by poorly received assertions of invincibility and superiority. 
Acknowledgement of weakness is a strength. Expertise should be in service of 
scholarship, not prioritised above it. Expertise idolatry risks encouraging defensive 
bullshit from the anxious and generating blinkered, dogmatic bullshit from specialists 
(Frankfurt, 2005; Ottati et al., 2015).  
 
4. Use all available evidence as effectively as possible. Important as they are, 
experiments are neither necessary nor sufficient for empiricism, scholarship, or 
“science” (Black, 1996; Robinson, 2000). To study important phenomena well, we 
need first to identify what they are and what central characteristics they have (Rozin, 
2001). To study things thoroughly, we need to identify processes and outcomes other 
than those derived from our pet ‘theories’. Evaluating the research literature may well 
require skills different to those that have been dominant during much of its production 
(Koch, 1981). In particular, we have found particularly effective accurately describing 
others’ procedures and outcomes in ordinary language and then examining how well 
these justify the usually jargonistic ‘theoretical’ claims supposedly supported by them 
(cf. Billig, 2013).   
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5. Nurture nuance. Experiments within psychology are usually (at best) little more 
than demonstrations that something can occur. This is usually in service of rejecting a 
null hypothesis but it is almost as often misreported as suggesting (or showing or, 
worst of all, ‘proving’) something much more substantial, i.e., that something does or 
must occur. Perhaps the single most important thing psychology can do to quickly and 
substantially improve itself is to be much more careful about specifying and 
determining the boundary conditions for whatever phenomena it claims to identify 
(Lakens, 2014; Ferguson, 2015; Schaller, 2015).  
 
6. Triage. A dimension can be conceived between what is important and what can be 
established relatively easily. Given that at least some areas of psychology seem awash 
with bullshit, we would be wise to prioritise evaluating topics of centrality and 
importance rather than on the basis that some reported findings are, for example, 
recent or amenable to testing using online experiments (Bevan, 1991). “Far better an 
approximate answer to the right question, which is often vague, than an exact answer 
to the wrong question, which can always be made precise” (Tukey, 1962, pp. 13-14). 
 
The heading we chose for this section is not rhetorical. We do not consider the 
recommendations we list as final or complete. Science is a social enterprise and we are 
interested to hear the views of others with perspectives different from ours. We are certain 
that something needs to be done, though. We’re fed up with all the bullshit. 
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